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Who Should Pay for Climate Change? "Not Me"
Paul Baer*

Abstract
In Climate Change Justice, Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach argue not only
that a climate treaty with signficant North-to-South redistribution of wealth is infeasible, but
also that to support such a treaty is counterproductive. They ague instead that all countries
should support an "optimal" climate treaty, balancing marginal costs and benefits, and that
side payments shouldgo to ensure that no countries-even wealthy, hzgh-polluting countries that
are externaligng huge costs and risks-are worse off than the status quo. They justify this
seeming contradiction to their welfarist moral theory by arguingthat North-South redistribution
is better handled in a separateforeign aid treaty. But their theory of InternationalParetanism
(IP)-which essentially holds that countries will notjoin treaties with significant net economic
costs-implies that no such foreign aid treaty will be forthcoming. Furthermore,at least one of
them has argued elsewhere that it is effectively impossible to estimate climate damages (due to
both scientfic uncertainty and normative controversy), and thus their "opimal" treaty may
itself be infeasible. Finaly, they accept the possible need for sanctions on free riders, which
suggests that International Paretianism and its assumption that treaties must be "selfenforcing" is not an insuperable constraint. For all of these reasons and more, this Article
argues that their case againstadvocating a redistributive treay is unconvincing.

Assistant Professor, School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology. The author would
like to thank Richard Norgaard for helpful comments, as well as all those who participated in the
Conference on Climate Change Justice at The University of Chicago Law School, at which an
earlier version of this paper was presented.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Responding to the risks of anthropogenic climate change requires us to
answer at least three fundamental and inescapably ethical questions:
(1) To what level should we try to restrict emissions of greenhouse gases
(GHGs)?
(2) Who should pay the costs of abatement (reducing emissions)?
(3) Who should pay the costs of responding to the climate changes that will
not be avoided?
In Climate Change justice,' Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach address the
of these questions, with the focus on the second. Drawing on a
two
first
2
welfarist ethical framework and a realist 3 view of international relations, the
authors criticize several widely held views about the "who pays" question. In
particular, Posner and Weisbach present a variety of ethical and pragmatic
reasons for rejecting the "conventional wisdom" about climate justice, which
holds that the developed countries, because of their affluence and high historical
emissions, should pay the bulk of costs for abatement, at least initially.4
1

Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, Climate ChangeJustice (Princeton 2010).

2

Welfarism holds that an act is good (and just) if it increases aggregate human welfare. The authors
note that utilitarianism is a variant of welfarism, and elsewhere distinguish their view (which they
call "weak welfarism") from strict utilitarianism on a variety of grounds. See generally Matthew D.
Adler and Eric A. Posner, New Foundationsfor Cost Beneit Anaysis 25-61 (Harvard 2006).

3

Realism in international relations is the view that countries act solely out of self-interest, and that
power alone determines outcomes. Historically this has been a view of military and security
policies, but more recently it has been adopted as a view of countries' international economic
policies, treating countries as rational utility-maximizers.

4

This of course is the premise of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), as well as almost all scholars (Climate Change Justice lists dozens) who have written on
the topic. Advocates for equal per capita rights typically note that such an allocation would have
this outcome.
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Indeed, the book comes across as a legalistic defense of the position of
many in the US that, in spite of our vast wealth and disproportionate emissions,
we need not pay any significant amount to developing countries for either the
right to emit GHGs or the harm our emissions will cause (hence the title of this
Article). To defend such a position in the face of quite strong justice-based
claims for redistribution, the authors mobilize a wide range of different
arguments, addressing matters from the ethical problems with collective
responsibility, to the practical consequences of corruption in developing country
governments, to the difficult question of intergenerational tradeoffs.
However, while the authors challenge common ethical justifications for
requiring redistribution in a climate change treaty, their major claim is a
pragmatic one: countries simply will refuse to accept any treaty that leaves them
worse off than the status quo. In the book and in their paper in this volume,'
they offer a defense of this argument, which they call "International
Paretianism" (IP). This assumption, which is related to the realist view of
international relations and to the economic concept of Pareto optimality, is used
widely by other scholars in analyses (especially those that use game theory) that
treat nations as rational utility-maximizers in an anarchic environment.6 Put
simply, since there is no authority to enforce participation, countries will refuse
to join any treaties from which they would not benefit.' However, it is rarely
defended quite so baldly in the context of climate change, likely because it can
lead to surprising results, with vulnerable countries like Bangladesh
compensating the US or China for reducing their emissions.' Indeed, the authors
acknowledge this.
Now, it is worth noting that, unlike Pareto optimality, which is a normative
principle, the authors hold that IP is simply an empirical constraint on feasible
treaties;' that is, they believe it is reasonable to conclude from past practice that
countries will not join treaties that impose large costs for small gains. And of
course the appeal of their argument is precisely the evidence that the historical

5

Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, InternationalParetianism:
A Defense, 13 Chi J Intl L 347 (2013).

6

It is perhaps significant in this regard that the version of "realism" the authors embrace assumes
that countries are concerned about absolute, rather than relative, gains and losses. In this way it
might be considered "econo-realism," because the link between economic gains and a country's
military power and security concerns has been deprecated to effective irrelevance.

7

8

What they call International Paretianism (IP) is closely related to the requirement that treaties be
"self-enforcing"-that is, that countries have no incentive to defect. See, for example, Scott
Barrett, Enironment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty Making 1-18 (Oxford 2003).
Interestingly, the authors implicitly see problems with this formulation. See Section IV on free
riding.
Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice at 86 (cited in note 1).

9

Posner and Weisbach, 13 Chi J Intl L at 348 (cited in note 5).
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record-and present international negotiations-offer in support of that
position. Given the authors' evident concern that the global costs of climate
change are quite large and potentially catastrophic, they therefore endeavor to
find a way to formulate an optimal treaty that is still consistent with realist
constraints.
Because the authors also explicitly support a welfarist view of distributive
justice (that is, that persons are obligated to act so as to improve aggregate
welfare) and assume on the basis of a conventional view of the "declining
marginal utility of income" that redistribution from rich to poor is welfareimproving, the acceptance of the possibility of upward redistribution in a climate
treaty seems rather contradictory. But the authors are sufficiently convinced of
their logic that they not only defend their position, they argue that academics or
activists who advocate a climate treaty with North-to-South redistribution risk
actually harming the poor."o
Posner and Weisbach's view poses a strong challenge to the proposal I
helped develop-the Greenhouse Development Rights framework (GDRs).
Although the GDRs framework only became prominent after their book was
completed and thus is not mentioned, it seems clear that they would consider it
non-feasible and potentially obstructive. If their arguments are correct, my
advocacy of GDRs is making the poor worse off, or runs an unacceptably large
risk of doing so. It should thus be unsurprising that I intend to mount a
vigorous-if indirect-defense of the GDRs framework by criticizing the
weaknesses and contradictions in their argument.
I should state up front that I find myself in agreement with Posner and
Weisbach on many points. Fundamentally, my GDRs co-authors and I share
with them a commitment to cosmopolitan justice" and a version of welfarism
that together justify large North-to-South redistribution. And we agree with
them that there are many reasonable objections to simplistic arguments for
historical accountability or equal per capita emissions rights. Indeed, the GDRs
framework is a response to many of the same issues that Posner and Weisbach
raise. But since our conclusions are so different, it seems imperative to try to
identify the sources of disagreement and to provide justification for choosing
10 See Posner and Weisbach, Chmate Change Jusce at 5 (cited in note 1) ("Those who make such
arguments, including representatives of poor countries but also academics and others in the
developed world, are likely in the end to hurt poor countries. If they demand too much from the
rich world, the rich world will drag its feet.").
11 Cosmopolitanism is the view that all humans should receive the same ethical consideration
regardless of nationality. See Simon Caney, Jusice Bgond Borders: A Global Poltral Theoy 3-4
(Oxford 2005); Cosmopoltanism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2006), online at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/ (visited Oct 9, 2012). See generally Thomas
W. Pogge, ed, GlobalJustce (Blackwell 2001).
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our approach. In an ideal world, either one group of us could convince the
other, or we could identify the irreconcilable assumptions (normative or factual)
that lead us to different conclusions. So far, nothing in their argument has
convinced me that we are wrong. We shall see whether they might be persuaded
that advocating for a redistributive agreement (like GDRs) might actually be
helpful in reaching a cooperative and welfare-enhancing agreement.
As I hope to show, the biggest source of disagreement is about the
significance of the requirement-if indeed it is one-that nations voluntarily
agree to a cooperative treaty. The authors take this to imply that every nation
must be at least roughly as economically well-off under a treaty as under the
status quo,12 which is defined as the existing distribution of emissions under
"business as usual" and of the expected (net) climate impacts.13 Given this
constraint, the question of what would be an ideally just climate treaty becomes
moot, as does the question of whether justice requires compensation for climate
harms.
Nonetheless, the authors don't seem to want to conclude that the
unwillingness of the rich countries to make large transfers to poor countries as
part of a climate treaty is in fact unjust. Thus they deploy a string of arguments
that attempt to rebut the claim that justice requires such North-South transfers.
Their arguments are by some standards quite careful. They are explicit about
premises, consider objections, and state frequently what might lead them to
change their minds. However, as I will attempt to show, their efforts to provide
justification for rich countries' stinginess in fact have a number of
inconsistencies or outright contradictions, and overall do not provide adequate
justification for their conclusions.
Indeed, the book shows a variety of blind spots when it comes to
understanding global climate policy discourses. As I will argue in the following
Section, their approach is overwhelmingly economistic, which leads them to see
optimality and feasibility constraints in the terms of conventional economic
models (both conceptual and quantitative). The real world is-as the authors
selectively point out-much more complex than the world of rational utilitymaximizers that populate economic and game-theoretic climate policy models.
But they overlook or downplay a number of important features of the global

12

I say roughly because they accept a modest role for altruism or ethically motivated behavior by
nations. See Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice at 178-80 (cited in note 1); see also my
discussion in Section V.

13

Technically, on the assumption that nations are "rational," the "status quo" would be each
country making nationally optimal emissions reductions-that is, balancing marginal abatement
costs with the strictly domestic marginal benefits. This would lead to significant reductions only
for the largest countries (or quasi-countries like the EU).
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political economy that suggest rather different constraints on feasible
agreements and different pathways to plausible solutions.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. In Section II, I address
the structure of Posner and Weisbach's argument at a high level, drawing the
connection to broader economic (or economistic) theories of politics and
international relations and tracing the consequences of these assumptions. In
Section III, I address their "victim pays" approach to the allocation of property
rights. In Section IV, I discuss the implications of the authors' surprising defense
of international sanctions against free riding. In Section V, I focus on the
contradiction between IP and the belief that a separate foreign aid treaty is more
desirable and more feasible than a redistributive climate treaty. In Section VI, I
conclude by revisiting-and unsurprisingly, rejecting-their claim that even
arguing for a redistributive climate treaty is counterproductive.
II. THE ECONOMIC FRAMING OF THE
CLIMATE JUSTICE PROBLEM
Policy arguments depend upon complex combinations of norms, factual
claims, background assumptions, and decision rules. These get combined in
frames that highlight various preferred ways of looking at a problem and
evaluating proposed solutions. Posner and Weisbach make a complex and
interlocking set of claims to justify their favored model of a global climate treaty.
A complete analysis of their arguments and frames would be a book in itself
(and would have to address related work, especially Adler and Posner's New
Foundationsfor Cost Benefit Analysis4 ). Thus, I will limit my primary analysis to a
few of their main arguments, though I will touch briefly on many more.
Although their book is titled Climate Changejustice, the primary frame within
which they work is economic; indeed, a better tide might be Climate Change
Efficiency. This shouldn't surprise us, as it comes from two members of the
University of Chicago's law and economics tradition. There are a number of
ways in which the economic framing of the problem is embodied in their
analysis; three key assumptions are perfect substitutability, the feasibility of costbenefit analysis (and the existence of "optimal" abatement), and the treatment of
nations as unified "rational actors."
Perfect substitutability means that climate change is treated as simply
another contributor to (or rather, detractor from) aggregate human welfare, and
that any harms that occur can be adequately monetized and substituted with any
other form of wealth or consumption. More generally, all streams of benefits or
costs are seen to be commensurable and fungible; reducing the harm from GHG
14

See generally Adler and Posner, New Foundaions(cited in note 2).
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pollution has no special justification if more welfare can be produced by any
alternative investment, regardless of who the beneficiaries are."
A second key part of the economic frame is the assumption that there is an
optimal ("efficient") level for any activity that can be calculated through costbenefit analysis; in this case the activity is the emission of greenhouse gases and
the abatement thereof. Optimal abatement maximizes (potential) aggregate
welfare by equalizing the marginal costs and marginal benefits of reducing
emissions. In spite of acknowledged difficulties with such calculations, the
authors here presume that it is possible, using a combination of science and
economics."
Based on these two assumptions, it follows that equity and efficiency are
completely separable; an efficient optimal arrangement ensures the largest
possible pie, which can then be redistributed according to other principles of
equity. This is the same move made within neoclassical economics more broadly,
and particularly in cost-benefit analysis, which assumes that the role of
economics is to ensure the "efficient" allocation of resources (sometimes
referred to as "Potential Pareto Optimality") and that the distribution of
endowments is a political matter to be settled elsewhere."
Notwithstanding the fact that prices are affected by the distribution of
endowments-and thus that the efficiency of a solution is not fully separable
from distributive questions'-it is at least plausible in a domestic political
context to argue that distributive concerns are part of general policymaking and
might be legitimately ignored in any single policy decision. However, as I will
discuss further below, the authors' position on IP, if accurate, implies that the
substantial redistribution of endowments between countries is unlikely to ever
take place. Thus the claim that the equity (distributional) aspects of a climate
treaty can be ignored because they will be compensated subsequently seems
unjustified.
A third important assumption they make is that nations can be treated as
unified rational actors who seek to maximize national economic welfare based
on exogenously determined preferences. The authors acknowledge that national
"self-interest" is not strictly economic, and they do explore-and selectively

15

Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Jusice at 175-78 (cited in note 1).

16

Id at 45, 55-58, 192.
Daniel W. Bromley, Environment and Economy 84-100 (Blackwell 1991). "Endowments" in the
economic frame are assets of all kinds: individual wealth, natural resources, human capital, etc.
Note that endowments are inseparable from the rights to specific benefit streams that are
embodied in institutions, both formal and informal.
See, for example, Richard B. Howarth and Richard B. Norgaard, IntergenerationalResource Rights,

17

18

Efciency, and Social Opimality, 66 Land Econ 1 (1990).
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make use of-more nuanced views of governmental decisionmaking."
Nonetheless, their approach implies (in fact requires) that governments are able
to determine their national interests based on scientific and economic analysis of
the costs and benefits of mitigation, and in fact represent those interests in
negotiations. Governments that act self-servingly against their nations' interests
are considered to be anomalies, even if they are not uncommon ones.
These assumptions play several key roles in the authors' analysis. First, the
substitutability assumption rules out the possibility that there is a right to
protection from anthropogenic climate change that could impose morally
binding obligations to limit emissions. 20 Even the possibility of catastrophic
impacts that might differentially impact the poorest countries is transformed
into just "a way of saying welfare gains from a climate treaty are very high."
Thus "a higher level of abatement is justified, but there are no particular
implications for distributive justice." 21 As far as those who will still be harmed,
there is not even a strong right to compensation. It is perfectly consistentindeed desirable-from the authors' perspective to give cash to poor people
today in lieu of an equivalent benefit through mitigation to (presumably)
wealthier future victims of actual anthropogenic climate change.22
The second assumption, that there is an "optimal" level of emissions
abatement, is central to the authors' positive vision of a desirable climate treaty.
As I noted above, by limiting emissions to the level at which the marginal costs
of emissions reductions are equal to the marginal benefits from reduced
damages, an optimal treaty maximizes the gains from cooperation and the
"surplus" available for distribution. The authors acknowledge a variety of
complications with such a calculation, 23 but the book proceeds on the
assumption that it can be done; indeed, their argument would seem to depend
entirely upon its feasibility.
Yet, in a subsequent article with Jonathan S. Masur, Posner argues that the
difficulties in objectively calculating the social cost of carbon (SCC), which is in
effect the same calculation as the benefits of emissions reductions, are

19

Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice at 90-91, 185 (cited in note 1). For example, at 90-91
they discuss the corruption of developing country governments, and at 185 they discuss the
possibility of governments acting altruistically based on their own or their constituents' values.

20

21

See generally Adler and Posner, New Foundations (cited in note 2). "Weak welfarism" as described
in New Foundations allows for the possibility of rights-based constraints on moral actions, but that
issue is never raised explicitly in Climate ChangeJusice--at least not in terms of a right to protection
from harm from climate change.
Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Jusice at 89 (cited in note 1).

22

Id at 76-79. The authors make this point most clearly in their example, "asteroid justice."

23

Id at 56-58.
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insuperable.2 4 Masur and Posner are remarkably blunt; they write in their abstract
". . . cost-benefit analysis cannot cope with inherently political questions
involving contested normative issues." Although the article focuses on domestic
policymaking in the US, a substantial part of their argument is based on the
inseparability of international considerations, both political and ethical, from
domestic decisions about the appropriate SCC.
In Climate Change justice, however, Posner and Weisbach-while
acknowledging that calculating marginal benefits is "enormously difficult" 25 assume that countries can and will agree sufficiently on an objective cost-benefit
calculation to be able to define optimal abatement. An assumption is not an
argument; a reasonable case could be made that the possibility of agreeing on
optimal abatement is so unlikely that it should be abandoned. Indeed, Masur and
Posner's argument in the US case could be seen as evidence that the difficulty of
agreeing on the benefits of mitigation is also a strong feasibility constraint on a
possible treaty.
The third economic assumption-that nations can be treated as rational,
self-interested actors-is also fundamental to their argument, inasmuch as it is
the basis for the IP constraint. Yet they also look beyond this assumption at
times, invoking a more nuanced view of political economy. This is one of the
book's key features, and, I would argue, both a strength and a weakness. Political
economy and class structure are acknowledged, particularly in developing
countries, where the existence of "corrupt elites" is often invoked;26 but the
authors also point out the often self-serving nature of "foreign aid" from
developed countries. In addition, the authors discuss at some length (and more
so in their Article in this volume) the ways in which governments may be
enabled or constrained to act ethically based on the demands of their citizens. I
will return to the significance of this point in the final section.
III. STATUS

QUO

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND "THE VICTIM PAYS"

In spite of the dominance of this economic framing, however, the authors
give relatively limited attention to the critical economic dimensions that make
climate change such a difficult problem: the nature of the climate system as a
public good, GHG emissions as a source of cross-border externalities, and the
need to create enforceable limits on the use of a currently open-access global

25

Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Climate Reguladtion and the Limits of Cost-Beneft Anaysis, 99
Cal L Rev 1557 (2011).
Posner and Weisbach, Climate Changejusice at 45 (cited in note 1).

26

See, for example, id at 73-98, 119-43.

27

Id at 179.

24
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resource. They address these issues briefly in Chapter 2, in which they discuss
the "tragedy of the commons," and to a lesser extent in Chapter 6, where they
analyze and criticize arguments for equal per capita emissions rights. But overall,
the authors seem to prefer not to draw undue attention to the fact that their
proposal not only gives effective property rights to the polluters (in terms of not
having to compensate the victims), it also gives the lion's share of the remaining
"carbon budget" to existing wealthy and high-polluting countries.28
The authors' attention to the problem of liability for harm is limited to a
very brief discussion of "polluter pays" liability in their chapter on corrective
justice. 29 After dismissing historical emissions as a justification for additional
mitigation obligations, they never return to the question of liability for the harms
that will occur, whether derived from past, present, or future emissions. And
while they state early on that they believe that wealthy countries should help
poor countries with adaptation,30 they note that this claim is "qualified" and then
do not subsequently address it substantively.
The crucial assumption the authors make is that the status quo allocation
of property rights, in which polluters have privilege and victims have no rght," is
de facto normatively legitimate. Victims of anthropogenic climate change cannot
expect to be compensated because doing so would require the polluters to make
transfers from which they would receive no direct benefit. For countries whose
share of emissions exceed their expected share of damages, this would be a
direct (and arguably very large) violation of the IP constraint.
When I say that this is "de facto normatively legitimate," I don't mean that
the authors believe that it might not be ethically warranted for polluters to
compensate victims, especially the poorest. Rather, in spite of their argument
that IP is an empirical rather than a normative constraint, they conclude that
while "pure" free riding (gaining from other countries' actions while refusing to
cooperate) is wrong and deserving of sanction, continuing to externalize

28

29
30
31

It is worth noting that the authors never model the actual allocation of emissions rights that they
believe would be consistent with their preferred treaty; thus all we can say for sure is that they
believe that the tens or hundreds of billions of dollars in permit purchases that would follow from
an equal per capita allocation are unfeasibly large.
Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Jusice at 99-118 (cited in note 1).
Id at 7.
See Bromley, Environment and Economy at 41-58 (cited in note 17). Following Environment and
Economy one can identify four states relevant to the regulation of pollution and other activities
with externalities: privilege (the ability to take an action without regard for the consequences to
others), liability (the ability to take action but only with compensation paid), right (the ability to
have protection from another's action enforced), and no right (no ability to have protection from
another's actions).
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significant damages from pollution should not be considered sanctionable, as
long as one cooperates to the point of being no worse off than the status quo.
Note that this renders infeasible-arguably in the case where it matters the
most-implementation of the principle of international law that countries have
the responsibility to ensure that the econonuic activities of their citizens do not
impose harms on other countries. This principle, reflected in the famous Trail
Smelter case32 and in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration 3 (which in turn is
referenced in the UNFCCC), would plainly require that nations either cease
activities that cause cross-border harms or compensate the victims. But where
large and asymmetrical externalities are the status quo, the IP requirement would
appear to rule out any such obligations.
Here, then, is the crux of the matter: in a world of sovereign nation states,
where joining any treaty is voluntary, there is no way to compel countries that
are profiting from unsustainable levels of pollution to compensate the people in
other countries who will be harmed by their pollution. By definition, the
internalization of externalities is a redistribution of property rights and
necessarily makes those who were profiting worse off than the status quo. Thus,
in an anarchic world, if there is to be any cooperation, the victims must pay the
polluters to reduce; their only other option is to suffer from pollution they have
no right to prevent.
Worse, since the reduction in damages caused by a treaty that changes the
status quo is considered a benefit, the more a country would be harmed by
climate change, the more is potentially available for redistribution to other
countries. Thus poor and vulnerable countries are expected to borrow against
future avoided harm to make necessary "side payments" to countries that would
otherwise be net losers.
If this offends us, Posner and Weisbach remind us that we can fall back on
the assumptions of substitutability and optimal distribution. Since the "optimal"
level of pollution is nominally independent of the assignment of rights regardless
of who pays for the reductions, they argue, there will be the largest possible pie
from which the "deserving" (poor) victims can be appropriately compensated
with an equivalent value in malaria nets or iPods.M

32

33

34

See generally Rebecca M. Bratspies and Russell A. Miller, eds, Transboundag Harm in International
Law: Lessonsfrm the Trail Smelter Arbitration(Cambridge 2006).
UN, General Assembly, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Entironment, UN
Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973), online at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/NL7/300/05/IMG/NL730005.pdPOpenElement (visited Oct 12, 2012).
Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice at 83 (cited in note 1). Note that the authors do not
actually mention iPods, but since all goods and services are considered commensurable, there is
by definition an equivalent value in any commodity.
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Nonetheless, this question of the right to protection from (and
compensation for) harm is at the heart of the real debate over climate change
justice. Outside the economic frame-and especially outside the US-it appears
that, as the authors put it, it is "the citizens of wealthy countries ... consuming
wasteful goods such as SUVs and heated swimming pools over many decades" 35
that will cause the extensive and potentially catastrophic harms that will be
predominantly experienced by poor countries. Posner and Weisbach's
conclusion-that the polluters should have no actual obligation to halt their
profligacy or compensate those who will be harmed by it, beyond that which fits
their own self-interest-surely violates what the authors in another context refer
to as our "basic notions of fair play."
IV. THE FREE RIDER PROBLEM
I suspect that it is their unrepentant embrace of this conclusion that has led
so many of their readers to criticize Posner and Weisbach's concept of "climate
justice." However, I want to emphasize a different point, which the authors
themselves point out, that if in fact the constraint of IP comes from nations'
pursuit of their self-interest, even treaties that are consistent with IP will be
rejected as countries will find it in their interest to free ride. The authors note
that:
Preventing free-riding will ultimately be a difficult problem of designing a
treaty to encourage participation by reluctant nations. A climate treaty might
have to be linked to other policies to effectively punish free-riders. To the
extent that ethical concerns play a role in solving this problem, we believe
that nations that refuse to sign a climate treaty so that they can free-ride off
emissions reductions by others are behaving unethically. Free-riding of this
sort offends basic notions of fair play.36
This paragraph can be read to undermine the authors' entire thesis. If it is
true, then ethical principles can be legitimately invoked to sanction countries
simply for pursuing their self-interest within bounds that were previously
unregulated. Recall the interpretation of the IP constraint that, regardless of how
wealthy it is and how much it pollutes, a country that believes it will gain little or
no benefits from limiting global warming can demand to be paid for all the
emissions reductions it makes. Posner and Weisbach would consider this
reasonable, even though the status quo involves the country externalizing the
entire cost of its pollution onto other countries. If, on the other hand, a country
were to refuse to accept payments to reduce its emissions to the optimal level or
(if it were a country that had net benefits from global reductions) to contribute

3s
36

Id at 99.
Id at 182.
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to such side payments, even to richer countries, the authors consider this to be
sanctionable free riding."
Why then can't the externalization of harm from pollution be considered
an ethical breach like free riding and countries be sanctioned for
disproportionate polluting? The answer seems to be that, given the evident
asymmetry of polluters and likely victims, the high polluters will simply refuse to
join such a treaty because it is not in their interest to do so and they cannot be
coerced.
Now, in either situation, the question remains how any such internationally
coordinated sanctions are to arise-truly a gigantic problem. Nonetheless, there
remains a paradox: either international enforcement is impossible, in which case
there is no ability to prevent free riding, or international enforcement is possible,
in which case IP is not automatically a constraint.
In their symposium paper, InternationalParetianism:A Defense, the authors
recognize and address this "puzzle." They hypothesize that a nation might be
motivated to "object to a treaty that makes them worse off than the status quo,
but not to a treaty that makes them less better off than a feasible alternative but
still makes them better off than the status quo."38 Although this is raised inthe
context of the distribution of the surplus, it applies to the problem of free riding
as well. But now we are relying on ethics rather than self-interest to motivate
countries. And if ethics motivates us, why not be ethically motivated to take
responsibility-and accept liability-for the impacts of our pollution?
The obvious point is that it is precisely to solve these kinds of collective
action problems that people are presumed to have entered into the social
contracts that characterize nation states. In order to preserve their own property
and well-being, citizens will cede the right to engage in activities that cause
uncompensated harms to others. The logical inference is that if the threat of
cross-border harms is now large, a global social contract with equivalent
principles and enforcement is now in order. This is of course the "inconvenient
truth" of anthropogenic climate change: it cries out for a solution through global
government. That one line-"A climate treaty might have to be linked to other
policies to effectively punish free-riders" 3 9-suggests that, ultimately, the authors
do not completely believe the climate problem can really be solved in an
anarchical global society.

38

Although they don't use the term, this is their response to the prisoner's dilemma structure of the
problem: while cooperation is globally welfare enhancing, any individual country is still better off
defecting. Sanctions appear as a necessary solution in this context.
Posner and Weisbach, 13 Chi J Intl L at 355 (cited in note 5).
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V. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL PARETIANISM
At the heart of Posner and Weisbach's argument, of course, is a second
paradox. Their view of welfarism implies that a redistributive treaty is morally
warranted. As the authors put it straightforwardly in their recapitulation, "It is
tempting to think that by virtue of their poverty, poor nations should not have
to spend as much on emissions reductions as those that are rich."' But the
authors' commitment to IP makes any such redistributive climate treaty
impossible, even though it is primafacie more just, the more it redistributes from
rich to poor.
Nonetheless, the authors apparently prefer not to have to conclude that the
poor countries should be required to accept an unjust treaty. They thus offer a
series of ethical arguments as to why a treaty that does not give poor countries
preferential treatment should still be considered fair enough, even if somehow
the wealthy countries are able to use their bargaining power to capture all of the
"surplus"-the gains from cooperation.41
Their key assumption is that the distributive justice obligations that follow
from income or wealth inequality are general and that any single action may fail
to be welfare maximizing without being judged unjust. The authors argue that
whatever the positive distributive consequences of a climate treaty, welfare
maximization can be better served through a separate foreign aid treaty.42 In
essence, this functions as a blanket waiver for any other aspect of a climate
treaty that might seem unfair, including the prospect that poor and vulnerable
countries like Bangladesh might be required to make side payments to much
wealthier but less vulnerable countries.
Indeed, the approach that the authors take implies that in an ideal world, a
climate treaty-or for that matter any international treaty intended to address a
global problem, like their "asteroid protection" example 4 3 -need not take any
consideration at all of distributive impacts. Nations would simply make sure
every single-issue treaty is itself efficient, maximizing the total "pie" to be
distributed, then, as they put it, "simultaneously adjust worldwide distribution
(say through taxation and spending) to produce the optimal level of
redistribution.""

40

Id at 189-90.

41

Id at 183-88.
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Id at 84-88, 175-78.
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The authors do not appear to believe that there will actually be such an
"optimal distribution regime." Yet they can and do argue repeatedly that rich
nations have obligations to redistribute wealth to poor nations (assuming that
the transfers actually reach poor people), and that in parallel with negotiating a
climate treaty, countries should continue striving for more generous and
effective foreign aid. And because, at least sometimes, they assume that this is
actually happening or going to happen to a significant extent, they are able to
dismiss the argument that a redistributive climate treaty, however inefficient,
would in fact be a more effective way to redistribute wealth than the other
available means.
The problem with this assertion, of course, is that given the constraint of
IP that is the authors' sine qua non, there is no case in which a country will ever
find it in its self-interest to redistribute large amounts of wealth or income to
poorer people in other countries. This point has not been lost on reviewers of
the book. Daniel A. Farber refers to it as "the fallacy of hypothetical
alternatives."4 5 I would call it "pie in the sky, by and by."
Now, the fact that there may be no significant increase in foreign aid is not
fatal to the authors' argument; on their accounting, poor and vulnerable
countries should and will join any treaty that leaves them better off than the
status quo, even if it quite literally requires them to make side payments to richer
countries. Nonetheless, even in this case there is perhaps some room for ethical
considerations, if nothing else regarding exactly how the "surplus" from an
optimal treaty should be divided.
Indeed, the authors note that ethical considerations can be part of a
country's view of its "self-interest" (and in fact the discussion of the role of
altruism, however minimal, depends on this assumption). Either governments
can independently exercise moral, non-economic interests due to what they call
"agency slack," or they can be motivated by the views of their citizens:
Suppose, for example, that a substantial number of people believe that they
should make sacrifices to reduce climate change even when those sacrifices
do not make them any wealthier.... If substantial numbers of people have
such a belief, then a state's "interest" in reducing global greenhouse gas
emissions would be greater, and thus it would be willing to incur treatyrelated costs that would not otherwise be cost-justified. 46
Furthermore, the authors assert that there is some small component of
existing foreign aid that can be considered to be truly based on altruism rather
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Daniel A. Farber, ClimateJusice, 110 Mich L Rev 985, 989 (2011) ("[A]lthough it may be true that
A [a redistributive climate treaty] would be better than B, we should not adopt A because there
might be some other hypothetical alternative that would be superior to A.").
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than the direct economic or security self-interest of donor countries.4 7 In their
Article, they explicitly consider the possibility that countries' altruism could be
"endogenous," and could change in response to moral argument 48 (which, to
make it clear, is precisely my own position). The authors' conclusion, however, is
that even if this altruistic motivation is possible, it is small relative to the scale of
transfers that have been suggested to follow from "climate justice." The authors
put it thusly: "[Ijn the entire history of international relations, it is impossible to
think of a treaty, based entirely or mainly on ethical ideals, that required
sacrifices or transfers anywhere near the magnitude of those entailed by idealistic
climate treaty proposals, such as the per capita system." 49 But the authors have
acknowledged that it is not a matter of principle; to borrow an old punch line, it
seems that "now we're just haggling over the price."
Several additional points can be made here. The first simply echoes Dale
Jamieson," which is that, once one accepts a subjective and multi-dimensional
conception of national self-interest, IP, like utility-maximizing for an individual,
is non-falsifiable and in that sense not a clear constraint. Countries could agree to
anything and anything they do agree to can be rationalized post hoc as being in
the subjective self-interest of either the government or the citizens.
The empirical question of how far countries are willing to go beyond direct
national economic interests does remain, and the evidence on this point is that
in general-and in the climate case, at least to date-the answer is "not far."
Posner and Weisbach give a long list various types of multilateral agreements
that seem to support their point.52 Nonetheless, as Jamieson points out," there
are many other relevant examples that defy a narrow (especially economistic)
interpretation of national interests. A similar point is made by DeCanio and
Fremstad, who estimate that the Marshall Plan involved transfers on the order
of 1 percent to 1.5 percent of GDP for a sustained period of time.54 And while
no one would argue that the Marshall Plan was not in the US's enlightened selfinterest, the climate crisis is plausibly a challenge to the US of at least the same
scale as the period of postwar reconstruction.
47
48
49
50
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See id. Although this "altruistic" component is still described as representing "self-interest."
Posner and Weisbach, 13 Chi J Intl L at 357 (cited in note 5).
Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice at 180 (cited in note 1).
See Now We're Just Haggng Over the Price, online at http://quoteinvestigator.com/2012/
03/07/haggling/ (visited Oct 12, 2012).
Dale Jamieson, Consequentiaismand Climatejusice, 13 Chi J Intl L 439, 456-57 (2012).
Posner and Weisbach, 13 Chi J Intl L at 353 (cited in note 5).
Jamieson, 13 Chi J Intl L at 457 (cited in note 51).
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So we have established that we concur with Posner and Weisbach on at
least two points: countries can be motivated by ethical or altruistic concerns, at
least to some degree, and ethics and altruism both justify large wealth transfers
from rich to poor, climate change or no. If we accept that the upper bound on
such transfers is not fixed and might in some cases be quite high, and that the
relevant decisions involve humans acting for reasons, why not make the best
case for the largest possible transfers?
VI. CONCLUSION: INTERNATIONAL PARETIANISM AND THE
DANGER OF JUSTICE
Thus I return to the claim that I take most issue with, that advocating a
redistributive treaty is actually counterproductive. I believe that the authors have
failed to show that this is likely, and indeed have offered a wide range of
arguments that appear to undercut it.
By the authors' own admission, the pure realist argument is "too strong";
they note that governments both have some latitude to act ethically,
independently of their citizens' direct economic interests, and also that suitably
motivated citizens might influence their governments to act ethically.ss
Furthermore, once any possibility for ethical action is acknowledged, it's a
slippery slope: "If ethical concerns play some role, then states might agree to
ethically proper treaties that do not serve their interests."s"
Since the authors are cosmopolitan welfarists who support "much greater
transfers to poor countries," they must believe it plausible that many other
Americans, perhaps even a majority, could eventually come to hold that position
as well. After all, in countries (think Scandinavian nations) that are in many ways
quite similar, the citizens support-and governments actually make!-much
greater proportional transfers to poor countries. The difference between US
levels of foreign aid (about 0.2 percent of GDP) versus Scandinavian levels
(about 1 percent of GDP) would add up to around $300 billion annually from
the high-income Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
countries.57
My interpretation of Posner and Weisbach's argument, then, is that they
make a political judgment that the possibilities for generating support for larger
transfers from the US government and citizenry to poor countries, in a timeframe
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Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change Justice at 180-81 (cited in note 1).
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short enough for it to matter for urent climate change negotiations, are negligible.
However, they offer no compelling reason to believe (in fact they really make no
argument) that trying to develop support in the US for a more just climate treaty
will actually lead to a less just treaty or no treaty at all. Indeed, evidence in the
US could easily be interpreted the other way; electing even a few senators who
believe, like Posner and Weisbach, that the US has large moral obligations to
developing countries could help facilitate a beneficial global treaty.
The pathway that the authors seem to be concerned about is rather that
developing country governments, under the influence of radical egalitarians like
me (or indeed like Posner and Weisbach themselves, when they're not wearing
their "realist" hats) will make unreasonable demands on the US and other
developed countries. In their Article, they go so far as to say:
Note [ ] that moral and political arguments that persuade Indians, Chinese,
Brazilians, and other people that they are entitled to a large portion of the
surplus generated by a climate treaty could derail such a treaty. The reason is
that the surplus is finite whereas the amount of money that people might
think appropriate to compensate them for moral harms is potentially
unlimited.58
Even more importantly, while the authors argue in one context that nations
can't be expected to make ethics the primary motivation of a treaty, they argue in
a different context that, in order to overcome free riding, governments need to
see ethical behavior as warranted even when it isn't in their national self-interest
and to see cooperation in (for example) international environmental treaties as
justifying the creation of enforcement mechanisms. In fact, as I pointed out
above, while Posner and Weisbach assert that IP is necessitated by the voluntary
nature of treaties, they argue that countries can and should be coerced to
cooperate in treaties that meet the IP standard. Given this, the argument that
promoting a just treaty can't help and is likely to be counterproductive seems
less than fully warranted.
There is much more that could still be said about Climate Change Justice,
about how its arguments would stand up against the specific justifications we
have given for a redistributive treaty in our Greenhouse Development Rights
framework, and more generally about its assessment of the prospects of a fair
climate treaty. I have not even begun to discuss the authors' critique of the
principle of equal per capita allocations, a topic on which I have previously
written extensivelys" before ultimately rejecting it in favor of the GDRs formula
for burden sharing. Nor have I addressed their discussion of discounting.
58
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The long and short of it, however, is that they have not succeeded in
causing me to doubt either the ethical or pragmatic value of our project. Now, I
would be the first to admit that when one becomes invested in one's own policy
designs, quite a few of one's justifying reasons can be refuted without causing
one to seriously question one's overall position. So I will try to remain open to
the possibility that their argument may be stronger, and my rebuttal much
weaker, than it seems to me at present. But I hope that they will similarly
consider that, if their arguments have as many contradictions as others and I
have shown, their basic conclusions may in fact be incorrect.
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